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REFINING THE TENTH CIRCUIT'S STANCE ON EMPLOYEE
RIGHTS: THE ADA, FREE SPEECH IN THE WORKPLACE,
AND THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT
INTRODUCTION
Employment law is an area in which many lawyers and non-lawyers
alike have experience. After all, most adults have either been employed
or employ others. The issue underlying many employment cases seems
to be the struggle to balance the employee's right to be treated fairly and
with dignity in the workplace, and the employer's need to maintain an
efficient, profitable business. This tension has formed a large and diverse
body of caselaw ranging from topics such as wages to sexual harassment.
This article focuses on United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit decisions in employment law from September, 2000 through
August, 2001. Employment law encompasses many different topics, and
it is not possible to discuss all the cases decided in the Tenth Circuit in
this writing. Therefore, this paper examines some of the more significant
cases decided in three common areas of employment law. Part I dis-
cusses the American Disabilities Act's requirement for reasonable ac-
commodation. Part II discusses free speech rights in the workplace, and
Part III examines the Fair Labor Standards Act.
I. ADA- REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION
A. Background
The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990' ("Act" or "ADA")
provides that private employers may not discriminate against qualified
individuals with disabilities and must accommodate workers who qualify
for accommodation.2 As part of this mandate, some courts, including the
Tenth Circuit, have held that the Act requires employers to consider reas-
signment into other available positions when a disabled employee cannot
perform the functions of his position.3 Until now, however, neither the
Act nor the Tenth Circuit have provided guidance as to the time frame
during which the employer must consider reassignment.4
The "EEOC [Equal Employment Opportunity Commission] guide-
lines and previous case law show that a 'reasonable accommodation'
may include reassigning the disabled employee to a different, vacant
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101,etseq. (2001).
2. See Christopher J. Murray & John E. Murray, Enabling the Disabled: Reassignment and
the ADA, 83 MARQuETrE L. REV. 721,722 (2000).
3. See Murray & Murray, supra note 2, at 722 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9)(B) (2001)).
4. See Murray & Murray, supra note 2, at 731.
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position for which he is qualified."' The Tenth Circuit in Smith v. Mid-
land Brake, Inc. ,6 set forth the criteria for determining an employer's
accommodation requirements if the employee has requested reassign-
ment to a vacant position.7 In Smith, the court held that "[i]f no reason-
able accommodation can keep the employee in his or her existing job,
then the reasonable accommodation may require assignment to a vacant
position so long as the employee is qualified for the job and it does not
impose an undue burden on the employer., 8 In order to withstand a mo-
tion for summary judgment by the employer, the employee must be able
to show the following:
(1) The employee is disabled within the meaning of the
ADA and has made any resulting limitations from
his or her disability known to the employer;
(2) The preferred option of accommodation within the
employee's existing job cannot reasonably be ac-
complished;
(3) The employee requested the employer reasonably to
accommodate his or her disability by reassignment
to a vacant position, which the employee may iden-
tify at the outset or which the employee may request
the employer identify through an interactive process,
in which the employee in good faith was willing to,
or did, cooperate;
(4) The employee was qualified, with or without rea-
sonable accommodation, to perform one or more ap-
propriate vacant jobs within the company that the
employee must, at the time of summary judgment
proceeding, specifically identify and show were
available within the company at or about the time
the request for reassignment was made; and
(5) The employee suffered injury because the employer
did not offer to reassign the employee to any appro-
priate vacant position.9
Some critics have argued that this rule is unclear because it does not
tell an employer how long he or she must seek a position for which the
5. Tenth Circuit Opines on ADA 'Reasonable Accommodations,' UTAH EMP. L. LETrER
(Wood Crapo, L.L.C.), June 2001, at 4.
6. 180 F.3d 1154 (10th Cir. 1999).
7. See Smith v. Midland Brake, Inc., 180 F.3d 1154 (10th Cir. 1999).
8. Smith, 180 F.3d at 1169.
9. Id. at 1179.
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employee is qualified as a reasonable accommodation.' ° Note that the
fourth factor only states the employee must show a position was avail-
able "at or about the time" of the request for reassignment." The Smith
court specified only that the term "vacant position... includes positions
that the employer reasonably anticipates will become vacant in the fairly
immediate future."' 2 In Boykin v. ATC/VanCom,'3 the Tenth Circuit at-
tempted to narrow the timeframe within which employers must reassign
an employee to a vacant position."
B. Boykin v. ATC/VanCom,
Fred L. Boykin ("Boykin") brought suit in Denver County District
Court against his former employer, ATCIVanCom of Colorado, L.P.
("VanCom"), claiming that VanCom violated certain sections of the
Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA").' 6 After VanCom removed the
case to federal court, Boykin appealed the ruling of the federal court
granting VanCom summary judgment.'7 The Tenth Circuit affirmed the
ruling of the district court.'8
1. Facts
VanCom hired Boykin as a part-time bus driver in 1997.' 9 Boykin
suffered from transient ischemic attacks ("TIA"), also known as mini-
strokes.2° While working for VanCom, Boykin suffered three TIAs, one
occurring while Boykin was driving a VanCom bus. 2' As a result of Boy-
kin's attack while driving the bus, VanCom required Boykin to undergo
an examination by a doctor hired by VanCom.22 The physician revoked
the medical certification Boykin needed for commercial driving for one
year, which would be reinstated if Boykin did not suffer any TIAs during
that year and was then cleared by a neurologist at the end of the year.
23
Boykin asked VanCom to accommodate his disability by reassign-
ing him to a dispatch operator or data-entry position.4 VanCom re-
sponded that neither position was available and offered Boykin a bus
10. See, e.g., Reassignment Obligation Doesn't Last Forever, Wyo. EMP. L. LETrER
(Holland & Hart), May 2001, at 7.
11. Smith, 180 F.3d at 1179.
12. Id. at 1175.
13. 247 F.3d 1061 (10th Cir. 2001).




18. Id. at 1066.
19. See id. at 1062.
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cleaner position.25 Boykin could not accept the position VanCom offered
because it conflicted with his schedule as a full-time college student.26
Boykin was subsequently terminated."
Six months later, new positions became available at VanCom be-
cause of a contract into which VanCom had entered with the Regional
Transportation District (RTD).28 The positions included an opening for a
dispatch operator.29 VanCom notified Boykin of the available positions
but added that Boykin would need to apply for the position.0 Boykin did
apply and was interviewed, but was not hired.3
Boykin sued VanCom for failing to comply with the ADA, con-
tending that VanCom should have assigned him to the dispatch operator
position when it became available instead of requiring him to apply for
the position along with other candidates. 32 Boykin also alleged that under
the ADA, VanCom was required to place him in the position as a reason-
able accommodation of Boykin's disability even though he was termi-
nated six months before the position became available.33 Further, Boykin
asserted that VanCom did not comply with the ADA when it offered the
bus cleaner position to Boykin because VanCom knew that the position
posed a schedule conflict with his school schedule.34 Finally, Boykin
claimed that VanCom violated the ADA by failing to "enter into the
good-faith interactive process required by the ADA. 35
The district court granted VanCom's motion for summary judgment
on the basis that VanCom did comply with the ADA in offering Boykin
the bus cleaner position.36 In addition, the court ruled that VanCom was
not required to offer Boykin the dispatch operator "position six months
after Boykin' s termination.,
37
2. Decision
The Tenth Circuit addressed Boykin's claim that VanCom violated
the ADA by failing "to offer Mr. Boykin a reasonable accommodation
for the period during which he was disabled from driving a passenger
25. See id.
26. See Boykin, 247 F.3d at 1062
27. See id.












bus."3 Boykin argued that VanCom should have placed him on indefinite
leave until a suitable position became available, because VanCom had
knowledge that positions would become available due to the pending
contract with RTD.39 The court did not accept this argument because: (1)
six months is not a reasonable amount of time within which an employer
must reassign an employee; and (2) VanCom was not required to ac-
commodate Boykin's personal schedule conflict with the bus cleaner
position, as the failure to accommodate constituted "discrimination on
other bases" not covered by the ADA.'
The court first discussed Boykin's contention that VanCom should
have placed him in a position after six months." The court found that,
under the ADA, a reasonable accommodation by an employer "may in-
clude reassignment to a vacant position for which the employee is quali-
fied. 4 2 This reassignment might also include positions that are not vacant
at the present time, but "also includes positions that the employer rea-
sonably anticipates will become vacant in the fairly immediate future."4'3
The court held that "[e]mployers should reassign an employee to a
position if it becomes 'vacant within a reasonable amount of time."'" To
determine a reasonable amount of time, the court must decide on a "case-
by-case basis and [it] is to be determined in light of the totality of the
circumstances."4'5 Here, the court held that VanCom did not violate the
ADA by failing to reassign Boykin six months after he was terminated,
nor was VanCom required to place Boykin on indefinite leave for an
"excessive amount of time" until a position became available. 6 However,
the court wrote that an employer is obligated to reassign an employee at
37 days.7
Second, the court discussed Boykin's argument that when VanCom
offered him the bus cleaner position, it violated the ADA because Van-
Coin knew that the job conflicted with his school schedule.48 The court
wrote that "the ADA forbids discrimination against a qualified individual
because of the disability, not 'discrimination on other bases."' 9 Further,
the court held that "the ADA 'does not require an employer to make ac-
commodation for an impairment that is not a disability within the mean-
38. Boykin, 247 F.3d at 1064.
39. Id.
40. Id at 1065 (quoting Buckley v. Consol Edison Co., 155 F.3d 150, 156 (2d Cir. 1998)).
41. Id. at 1064.
42. Id.
43. Id. (quoting Smith v. Midland Brake, Inc., 180 F.3d 1154, 1175 (10th Cir. 1999)).
44. Boykin, 247 F.3d. at 1065 (quoting Buckley v. Consol. Edison Co., 155 F.3d 150, 156 (2d
Cir. 1998)).
45. Id.at 1064 (quoting 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, App. § 1630.2(o) (2000)).
46. Id. at 1065.
47. See id. (citing Monette v. Elec. Data Sys. Corp., 90 F.3d 1173, 1187 (6th Cir. 1996)).
48. Id. at 1065.
49. Id. (quoting Buckley v. Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y., Inc., 155 F.3d 150, 156 (2d Cir.
1998).
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ing of the Act or that does not result from such a disability."'" In sum,
even though Boykin's TIA fell within the meaning of the ADA, VanCom




In Monette v. Elec. Data Sys. Corp." the Sixth Circuit established
that an employer must reassign a disabled employee to a vacant position
that will become available in a short amount of time. 2
Monette was a customer service representative for the defendant,
Electronic Data Systems Corporation. 3 He was injured at work when
some heavy equipment fell on him 4 After returning to work from medi-
cal leave related to his disability, Monette was placed on unpaid medical
leave for thirty-seven days until a position could be located.5 After that
time, the defendant terminated Monette, concluding that it could not re-
assign Monette to any other positions within the company. 6 Monette
sued the defendant pursuant to the ADA and provisions of the Michigan
Handicappers' Civil Rights Act. 7 Monette proposed that he be placed on
indefinite unpaid medical leave until a position became available. 8
The Sixth Circuit held that the defendant was not required to place a
disabled employee on indefinite unpaid medical leave until a vacant po-
sition arose. 9 However, the Court stated in dicta that "[i]f, perhaps, an
employer knows that a position for which the disabled applicant is quali-
fied will become vacant in a short period of time, the employer may be
required to offer the position to the employee. '
The Sixth Circuit further found in Hoskins v. Oakland County Sher-
iffs Dept ' that an employer was required to reassign an employee if a
position became available "within a reasonable amount of time," but the
50. Id. at 1066 (quoting Buckley v. Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y., Inc., 155 F.3d 150, 156 (2d
Cir. 1998); cf. 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, App. § 1630.9 (2000)).
51. 90 F.3d 1173 (6th Cir. 1996).
52. See Monette, 90 F.3d at 1173.





58. See Monette, 90 F.3d at 1187.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Hoskins v. Oakland County Sheriffs Dept., 227 F.3d 719 (6th Cir. 2000).
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particular employer in that case was not required to assign an employee
to a position one year after the employee's disability was disclosed.62
2. Eighth Circuit
In Cravens v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Kansas City,63 the
Eighth Circuit followed the rule articulated in Monette by stating that a
reasonable accommodation can include reassigning the disabled em-
ployee to a vacant position.6 This vacant position may include not only
vacant positions at the time of the reassignment request, but also those
that will become available "in a short period of time. 65
D. Analysis
The importance of Boykin comes from its narrowing of the time-
frame during which employers must consider reassigning a disabled em-
ployee to a vacant position if a suitable position is not available at the
time of the request."6 Even though the Tenth Circuit did not provide a
bright-line rule and instead opted for a "case-by-case" approach, em-
ployees seeking accommodation and employers attempting to accommo-
date have a clearer picture of what vacant positions must be included in
67the accommodation search. Now, in the Tenth Circuit, six months is
generally too long to require an employer to reassign an employee to a
68position that has become available. In addition, an employer is not re-
quired to place an employee on unpaid medical leave until a vacant posi-
tion becomes available.69
However, Boykin illustrates the idea that an employer must also
widen the scope of the meaning of "vacant" to include positions that an
employer believes may become available in the next few months. If the
employer fails to consider a position that may become available in the
next six months, the employer may be liable under the ADA for failure to
accommodate.7'
Another important aspect of Boykin is that it parallels with the
holdings of the Second Circuit when it states that "[t]he ADA does not
require an employer to make accommodation for an impairment that is
62. Hoskins, 227 F.3d at 729.
63. 214 F.3d 1011 (8th Cir. 2000).
64. Cravens, 214 F.3d at 1019 (discussing the decision in Monette v. Elec. Data Sys. Corp. 90
F.3d 1173, 1187 (6th Cir. 1996)).
65. Id.
66. See Boykin v. ATC/VanCom, 247 F.3d 1061 (10th Cir. 2001).
67. See Boykin, 247 F.3d at 1065.
68. See id.
69. Id.
70. See Indefinite Leave not Required as ADA Accommodation, N. M. EMP. L. LETER
(Hinkle, Hensley, Shanor & Martin, LLP), Aug. 2001, at 1.
71. See Christopher M. Leh, Reassignment Six Months After Termination not Required Under
ADA, CoLO. EMP. L. LETER, June 2001, at 1.
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not a disability within the meaning of the Act or does not result from
such a disability."72 This principle will defeat an argument, such as that
made by Boykin, that an accommodation offered by a company might be
unreasonable if it conflicts with the plaintiff s schedule.73
II. FREE SPEECH RETALIATION CLAIMS
A. Background
Public employees have a limited right to free speech in the work-
place.74 Freedom of speech for public employees has evolved through
cases that consider the issue of freedom of public employees to associate,
and more specifically, public employees who were required to take loy-
alty oaths. 75 The Supreme Court wrote that "the right to speak on matters
of public concern must be wholly free or eventually be wholly lost.
7 6
While the loyalty oath cases protected a public employee's right to free
association and speech, little guidance was offered by the Supreme Court
to employers as to the extent of the employee's freedom of speech.77
1. The Pickering Balancing Test
It was not until Pickering v. Board of Education7 8 that the United
States Supreme Court set forth criteria to help determine the scope of a
public employee's right to free speech. 79 The Supreme Court devised a
test in order to strike a "balance between the first amendment rights of
public employees and the proper exercise of managerial authority by
state employers." 80 As citizens, public employees should be able to com-
ment on matters of public concern, while still allowing the State to effi-
ciently provide services to the people.' Thus, an employee can only win
his or her case against an employer if his or her speech is shown to re-
gard a matter of public concern.82
In Pickering, the first factor in the balancing test was to consider the
working relationship between the parties. 83 "[A] close working relation-
72. Boykin v. ATCNanCom, 247 F.3d 1061, 1066 (10th Cir. 2001) (quoting Buckley v.
Consol. Edison Co., 155 F.3d 150, 156 (2nd Cir. 1998)).
73. See Boykin, 247 F.3d at 1065-66.
74. Stephen Allred, Connick v. Myers: Narrowing the Free Speech Right of Public
Employees, 33 CATH. U. L. REV. 429, 429-30 (1984).
75. See id. at 433.
76. Wiemann v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 193 (1952) (Black, J., concurring).
77. Allred, supra note 74, at 437.
78. 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
79. See Allred, supra note 74, at 437.
80. Id. at 438.
81. See id. at 430.
82. See Michael L. Wells, Section 1983, the First Amendment, and Public Employee Speech:
Shaping the Right to Fit the Remedy (And Vice Versa), 35 GA. L. REV. 939, 941 (2001).
83. See Allred, supra note 74, at 438.
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ship between the employee and the managers who are the subjects of the
employee's criticism could tip the balance in favor of the employer's
right to limit free speech."' Second, the Court examined whether the
speech had a detrimental effect on the employer." Specifically, this fac-
tor looked at whether the "public agency could continue to accomplish
its mission in light of the employee's statements on a matter of public
concern." 6 The third factor was the employee's relationship to the issue
and the nature of the issue that was the subject of the employee's
speech." If the employee had expertise related to the issue, the speech
was more likely to be protected because the employee made a "valuable
contribution to public understanding" of the issue.88
2. Matters of Public Concern
It then became important to distinguish what exactly was "a matter
of public concern." 89 In Connick v. Myers,' the United States Supreme
Court held that if the employee's speech did not constitute a matter of
public concern, the speech was not protected, and no balancing test was
needed.9' Also in Connick, the Supreme Court held that the expressive
activities of an Assistant District Attorney who circulated a questionnaire
about office morale and management practices did not touch upon a
matter of public concern.92 "Whether an employee's speech addresses a
matter of public concern must be determined by the content, form, and
context of the speech, and that speech must relate to some matter of po-
litical, social, or other concern to the community. 93 After Connick,
"[w]hen the employee's speech is about narrow issues relating to the in-
ternal management of the agency, lower courts tend to characterize it as a
personal grievance or as part of performing the job itself, rather than as
involving a matter of public concern." 9
The Tenth Circuit uses a modified Pickering/Connick test in order
to evaluate a party's First Amendment retaliation claim.95 First, the court
examines "whether the employee's speech involves a matter of public
concern." 96 If the speech does involve a matter of public concern, then
84. Id. at 439.
85. See id.
86. Id.
87. See id. at 440.
88. Id.
89. See Allred, supra note 74, at 438.
90. 461 U.S. 138 (1983).
91. See Allred, supra note 74, at 432.
92. See id. at 431-32.
93. Buazard v. Meridith, 172 F.3d 546, 548 (8th Cir. 1999) (quoting Connick v. Myers, 461
U.S. 138, 14647 (1983).
94. Wells, supra note 82, at 953.
95. See Dill v. City of Edmund, 155 F.3d 1193, 1201 (10th Cir. 1998).
96. Finn v. New Mexico, 249 F.3d 1241, 1247 (10th Cir. 2001) (quoting Dill v. City of
Edmund, 155 F.3d 1193, 1201 (10th Cir. 1998).
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the court must balance "the employee's interest in commenting upon
matters of public concern 'against the interest of the State, as an em-
ployer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs
through its employees."'97 Third, if the balancing test favors the em-
ployee, the employee must then demonstrate "that the speech was a 'sub-
stantial factor or a motivating factor in the detrimental employment deci-
sion." 98 Finally, if the speech is proven to be a factor, then the employer
may show that "it would have taken the same action against the em-
ployee" despite the occurrence of the protected speech.99
The Tenth Circuit used the hybrid Pickering/Connick analysis in the
following two cases discussed below: Finn v. New Mexico,'°° and Ballard
v. Muskogee Regional Medical Center.'1'
B. Finn v. New Mexico"°2
1. Facts
John Finn had been an employee of the New Mexico State Highway
and Transportation Department ("Department") beginning in 1974.'03 In
1995, a new administration announced the reorganization of the depart-
ment, which resulted in Finn's demotion and transfer to a different divi-
sion.'04 Finn argued this decision was illegal because the Department
acted without the approval of the New Mexico State Personnel Office.'05
Once Finn was officially notified that he would be demoted and
transferred to another division within the department, he began sending
Intra-Department Correspondence ("IDC") memorandums to the new
upper management.' ° The first IDC contained assertions by Finn that the
management was abusing its power and "attempting to 'crucify"' Finn.' °'
After this first correspondence, Finn left for medical reasons, and upon
his return to work he was notified that he was again demoted.'08
Finn then sent an IDC to the new upper management along with
over thirty-five other agencies and individuals, criticizing the reorgani-
zation of the Department.' 9 This IDC contained statements that the "De-
97. Finn, 249 F.3d at 1247 (quoting Dill, 155 F.3d at 1201).
98. Finn, 249 F.3d at 1247 (quoting Dill, 155 F.3d at 1202).
99. Finn, 249 F.3d at 1247 (quoting Dill, 155 F.3d at 1202).
100. Id.
101. 238 F.3d 1250 (10th Cir. 2001).
102. 249 F.3d 1241 (10th Cir. 2001).
103. See Finn, 249 F.3d at 1244.
104. See id.
105. See id
106. See id. at 1244-45.
107. Id. at 1245.
108. See id.
109. See Finn, 249 F.3d at 1245.
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partment's use of the phrase 'Equal Opportunity Employer' was a 'sick
joke.""' Finn also claimed that the department reorganization was the
result of favoritism, and that Roybal, the new Deputy Secretary, was
unqualified for his position."' Finn added personal attacks against Roy-
bal as well."
2
During the next two weeks, Finn sent two more IDCs with similar
content."3 Finn was then given notice that disciplinary action could ensue
if he did not cease his acts which were considered to be "detract[ing]
from . . . maintaining a positive work environment."'"4 Finn disregarded
the warning and sent another IDC to several individuals and agencies
that made, among other things, statements accusing Roybal of engaging
in an adulterous affair with a married employee, and promoting the em-
ployee after the employee's marriage ended. "' Finn was terminated after
this IDC.11
6
Finn then filed suit in the district court, alleging that the defendants
infringed upon his right of free speech.' '7 The defendants filed a motion
for summary judgment, arguing that Finn's speech was unprotected by
the First Amendment because it "was not a matter of public concern and
that defendants' interest in regulating such speech outweighed plaintiff's
interest in engaging in the speech.""' 8 Rahn, an individual defendant, also
filed a motion for summary judgment on the basis that he had qualified
immunity against Finn's claims." 9 The district court denied both motions
and Rahn appealed to the Tenth Circuit. 20
2. Decision
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's ruling. 2 ' The court
assessed Finn's First Amendment retaliation claim using the four-part
test applied in Dill v. City of Edmond, another Tenth Circuit case.122 The
court concluded that only the first two parts of the test needed to be ad-
dressed in that case.' 3 First, to determine whether a government em-





114. Id. at 1246.






121. Finn, 249 F.3d at 1249.
122. See id. at 1247. See also Dill v. City of Edmond, 155 F.3d 1193, 1201-02 (10th Cir.
1998).
123. See Finn, 249 F.3d at 1247.
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ployee has spoken 'as a citizen upon matters of public concern' or
merely 'as an employee upon matters only of personal interest."
24
While speech pertaining to internal personnel disputes and working
conditions ordinarily will not involve public concern, "speech that
seeks to expose improper operations of the government or questions
the integrity of governmental officials clearly concerns the vital pub-
lic interests." In making this determination, we consider the "content,
form and context of a given statement, as revealed by the whole rec-
ord. ,2 5
The main issue was that while portions of Finn's speech did consti-
tute matters of public concern, much of the content of the IDCs was of
personal interest to Finn.2 6 The defendants argued on appeal that the
district court erred when it failed to consider the speech in its entirety
and instead made its decision by "picking and choosing" certain parts of
the speech as protected.2 7 The Tenth Circuit rejected this argument,
holding that Finn satisfied the first part of the test, because limited por-
tions of Finn's speech did "touch on matters of public concern."' 28 How-
ever, the court noted that a mere "tidbit" of speech that touched on mat-
ters of public concern would limit the employee's interest in the
speech. 29 In sum, enough of Finn's speech touched upon matters of pub-
lic concern to protect it.'3°
Next, the court applied the second part of the Pickering analysis.3
This is a balancing inquiry, weighing the "employee's interest in com-
menting upon matters of public concern 'against the interest of the State,
as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it per-
forms through its employees.",132 To evaluate the employer's interest, the
court considered "whether the statement impairs discipline by superiors
or harmony among co-workers, has a detrimental impact on close work-
ing relationships for which personal loyalty and confidence are neces-
sary, or impedes the performance of the speaker's duties or interferes
with the regular operation of the enterprise.' 3  Because the court did not
find any evidence that the speech caused disruption, there was no state
124. Id. (quoting Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147 (1983)).
125. Finn, 249 F.3d at 1247 (quoting Conaway v. Smith, 853 F.2d 789, 797 (10th Cir. 1988));
Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147-48 (1983).
126. See Finn, 249 F.3d at 1247-48.
127. Id. at 1248.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 1249.
130. Id. at 1248.
131. Id. at 1249.
132. Finn, 249 F.3d at 1248. (quoting Dill v. City of Edmond, 155 F.3d 1193, 1201 (10th Cir.
1998)).
133. Id. at 1249. (quoting Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 388 (1987)).
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interest to prohibit Finn's speech, and thus the First Amendment pro-
tected the speech."
Overall, the court has reached many different outcomes using the
same standard. For example, here, the court found Finn's speech to be
protected by the First Amendment, whereas in the case of Ballard v.
Muskogee Reg'l Med. Ctr.,133 the court found that the First Amendment
afforded no such protection.
C. Ballard v. Muskogee Regional Medical Center
36
1. Facts
Ballard was employed as a psychological technician at the
Muskogee Regional Medical Center ("Medical Center") and sued after
she was terminated. 3 7 Ballard alleged that she was wrongfully terminated
after she notified the County Health Department that a patient was in
poor condition.' 38 The Medical Center argued that Ballard's work per-
formance was the reason for her termination. 39 The Medical Center ex-
plained that Ballard had encouraged "a known suicidal patient to jump
out of a window," and misrepresented herself as a nurse.14
The jury had found that Ballard was wrongfully terminated on the
basis of free speech retaliation, but also that she would have been termi-
nated for reasons other than her speech.'
2. Decision
The Tenth Circuit reversed the district court's holding, ruling that a
jury cannot award damages for the plaintiff if the jury also finds that the
defendant had legitimate grounds upon which to terminate the plaintiff. 
4 2
Using the Pickering analysis, the court held that the employer's liability
was relieved if it could show that it terminated the employee for reasons
other than the exercise of speech.'4 ' Thus, the employer satisfied the
fourth part of the test, despite the lower court's ruling that the other rea-
sons did not "negate the constitutional violation which occurred, and
according to the Civil Rights Act of 1991, ... merely affects the Plain-
tiffs damages."'" In conclusion, the court found that there were other
134. See id.
135. 238 F.3d 1250 (10th Cir. 2001).
136. 238 F.3d 1250 (10th Cir. 2001)





142. See id. at 1253.
143. See Ballard, 238 F.3d at 1253.
144. Id.
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substantial reasons for the Plaintiffs termination, which negated any




The Seventh Circuit reached a different outcome using the Picker-
ing/Connick analysis. For example, in Khuans v. Sch. Dist.,'46 Khuans, a
schoolteacher, was terminated after speaking to the principal about her
problems with a fellow employee.1 47 Khuans told the school's principal
that the other employee often could not be found at school during the
school day, and that she had problems communicating with the em-
ployee. 48 After complaining, the Assistant Administrator informed
Khuans that she would be replaced. 49 The district court denied the su-
perintendent's claim of immunity, and he appealed to the Seventh Cir-
cuit. 5°
The Seventh Circuit rejected Khuans' claim of retaliation because
even though she did speak upon matters of public concern, she also
spoke about matters that were not relevant to the public. 5' For instance,
while Khuans informed school officials that the employee failed to fol-
low mandates pursuant to the Individuals with Disabilities Education
Act, the court characterized Khuans' comments about the employee's
inability to communicate as not a matter of public concern. 52 The Court
further wrote that the district court erred when it held that there was a
constitutional violation because "one item of speech was protected."'53
Because Khuans' speech was more private than public, it was not pro-
tected by the First Amendment. 14
Further, the court held that even if Khuans' speech was a matter of
public concern, the speech must be weighed against the "actual and po-
tential disruption caused by her remarks."'55 The court opined that
Khuans' speech was shown to be disruptive by interfering with staff re-
lationships, challenging authority, and causing meetings to be held which
145. Id.
146. 123 F.3d 1010 (7th Cir. 1997).
147. See Khuans, 123 F.3d at 1012.
148. See id.
149. See id.
150. See id. at 1013.
151. See id. at 1016-17.
152. See id.





were not part of the daily operations of the school.'5 6 In light of these
factors, Khuans' speech was not protected.' 5'
2. Eighth Circuit
The Eighth Circuit, in Buazard v. Meridith,'5 s used the Pickering
analysis, and held that a police officer's speech about personnel issues
was not protected.'59 The court in Buazard held that "when a public em-
ployee's speech is purely job-related, that speech will not be deemed a
matter of public concern."' 6 This is distinguishable from Finn in that
under the Buazard holding, Finn's speech about management practices
would not have been a matter of public concern, and thus not protected.
E. Analysis
Finn and other cases cited above illustrate the diverse outcomes
reached through use of the same test. The Seventh and Eighth Circuits
place the line between protected and unprotected speech in different
places. 6' The Tenth Circuit's holding in Finn seems to be more favorable
to employees because it protects speech that other circuits would not;
namely, speech that is job-related.' 62 In addition, the Tenth Circuit over-
looked the fact that much of Finn's speech was directed toward individ-
ual supervisors, and not public issues. 63 Comparing Finn with the cases
cited from other circuits, Finn markedly departs from the usual outcome
of First Amendment speech retaliation cases brought by public employ-
ees.'6 Finn's speech was inflammatory and personal as compared with
the speech denied protection in Khuans, yet Finn's speech was given First
Amendment protection by the Tenth Circuit. 65 Further, both employees
spoke about matters of private and public concern, but the speech that
was protected by the Tenth Circuit was delivered in a way that seemed
less disruptive to the workplace.' 66
The vast difference in outcomes is illustrative of the wide discretion
of the lower court judges in applying the Pickering/Connick test. 67 The
Pickering progeny use three values to decide legal outcomes of a variety
of fact patterns: (1) efficiency of government services; (2) allowing em-
156. See id.
157. Seeid. at 1018.
158. 172 F.3d 546, 548 (8th Cir. 1999).
159. See Buazard, 172 F.3d at 548.
160. Id.
161. See Khuans, 123 F.3d 1017-18; Buazard, 172 F.3d at 548.
162. See Finn, 249 F.3d at 1249.
163. See id
164. Compare Finn v. New Mexico, 249 F.3d 249 F.3d 1241 (10th Cir. 2001), with Khuans v.
Sch. Dist., 123 F.3d 1010 (7th Cir. 1997), and Buazard v. Meridith, 172 F.3d 546 (8th Cir. 1999).
165. See Finn, 249 F.3d.at 1245-46; See also Khuans, 123 F.3d at 1012-13.
166. See Finn, 249 F.3d at 1249.
167. See Wells, supra note 82, at 960-61.
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ployees to speak on matters of public concern; and (3) government's
diminished interest in the speech if its relation to the workplace is low.'
68
Even though the values are the same, courts focus on different parts of
the analysis to decide whether the speech should be protected; some fo-
cus on aspects such as the "internal-external" aspect of the person's
speech, while other courts place more emphasis on whether the speech
was disruptive to the workplace. 69
Such diversity in the area of public employee speech cases mirrors
the sentiments by writers on the topic. Those that encourage public em-
ployee speech protection feel that the courts have not gone far enough to
guard employees from retaliation, noting that courts should not focus on
disruption or the "virtue of obedience."'7 Others assert that limiting the
First Amendment speech rights of public employees fosters efficiency
and a harmonious workplace. 7'
The wide range of outcomes and opinions concerning public em-
ployee speech protection may signal that a narrower test or standard is
more desirable. On the other hand, the flexible Pickering/Connick analy-
sis may be well suited to meet the needs of both management and em-
ployees in different government workplaces.
III. FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT
A. Background
The Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA") requires employers to pay
any qualified employee under the FLSA minimum wage for the hours the
employee worked, and must generally pay overtime for hours worked
over forty hours per week.7 2 Therefore, the definition of "work" becomes
key to the issue of on-call time because if the definition of work only
includes the time spent responding to the call, an employee will not be
compensated for any time spent on-call and restricted from engaging in
personal activities.13 Compensation for on-call time is becoming a more
prominent issue in the courts due to the tendency of employers to use
employees more efficiently through the use of on-call time.'
74
The United States Supreme Court resolved a conflict in the lower
courts in 1944 when it decided two cases on the same day: Armour &
Co. v. Wantock, 75 and Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 17 6 In these cases, fire-
168. See id. at 991.
169. See id. at 965-67.
170. See id. at 942.
171. See id.
172. See Pabst v. Okla. Gas & Elec. Co., 228 F.3d 1128, 1132 (10th Cir. 2000).
173. See Eric Phillips, On-Call Time Under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 95 MICH. L. REV.
2633, 2634 (1997).
174. See Phillips, supra note 173, at 2647.
175. 323 U.S. 126 (1944).
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fighters sued for compensation for the time they were required to remain
at the station, waiting for a call, yet were idle while waiting.'77 The Su-
preme Court held in both cases that the plaintiffs were entitled to com-
pensation." Framing the issue as whether the employee's "time is spent
predominantly for the employer's benefit or for the employee's," the
Supreme Court opined that the answer depended on "all the circum-
stances of the case.' ' 179 The Court wrote that such circumstances as the
"agreement between the parties, the nature and extent of the restrictions,
[and] the relationship between the services rendered and the on-call
time" should be examined.'O
In the Tenth Circuit, most decisions have held that on-call time was
not compensable. In Norton v. Worthen Van Service, Inc.,'8 the Tenth
Circuit held that van drivers were not eligible for compensation for on-
call time because the employees had opportunities in between calls to
engage in personal activities, such as exercise, do laundry, visit friends,
and go to restaurants. 82 Therefore, the restriction on personal activities
was not enough to be considered predominantly for the employer's bene-
fit.83 Similarly, in Armitage v. City of Emporia,'8" the Tenth Circuit de-
cided that an employee who is "merely required to leave word at his
home or with company officials where he may be reached is not working
while on call."'85
However, the Tenth Circuit held that on-call time was compensable
in Renfro v. City of Emporia.'86 Firefighters for the city were not required
to remain on the station premises while on call but were required to re-
port back to the station within twenty minutes of receiving a callback.'
8 7
In addition, the firefighters received a large number of calls while on
call." The firefighters argued that the restrictions were so severe that the
employees could not be with their children alone without a caretaker on
call, could not go to dinner or a movie, could not work on their cars, nor
participate in activities with groups of people for fear that they would be
called. 8 9 The court held that the callbacks were so frequent that the fire-
176. 323 U.S. 134 (1944).
177. See Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 135-36 (1944); Armour v. Wantock, 323 U.S.
126, 127 (1944).
178. See Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140; Armour, 323 U.S. at 134.
179. Armour, 323 U.S. at 133.
180. Andrews v. Town of Skiatook, 123 F.3d 1327, 1330 (10th Cir. 1997) (citing Skidmore,
323 U.S. 134).
181. 839 F.2d 653 (10th Cir. 1988).
182, See Norton, 839 F.2d at 655-56.
183. See id. at 656.
184. 982 F.2d 430 (10th Cir. 1992).
185. Armitage, 982 F.2d at 432.
186. 948 F.2d 1529 (10th Cir. 1991).
187. See Renfro, 948 F.2d at 1531.
188. See id. at 1532.
189. See id
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fighter was not able to use the on-call time "for his own benefit." '9° This
case is one of the rare cases holding for the employee in on-call compen-
sation disputes.'9'
B. Tenth Circuit Decisions
1. Pabst v. Okla. Gas & Elec. Co.'92
a. Facts
Kathy Pabst, James Gilley, and Steve Barton were employed at
Oklahoma Gas & Electric Company ("OG&E") as Electronic Techni-
cians. 193 Their duties consisted of "monitor[ing] automated heat, fire, and
security systems" in OG&E buildings.'19
The plaintiffs were required to be on call from 4:30 p.m. until 7:30
a.m. and twenty-four hours a day on weekends.' 9 If one of the plaintiffs
received a call, they were to respond within ten minutes.'" This was until
1996, when the response time was changed to fifteen minutes.9 7 If the
plaintiffs failed to respond to the call within the allotted time, it was
grounds for discipline.' 98 The plaintiffs were required to carry a pager to
receive calls.' 99 These pagers were not effective all the time, so the plain-
tiffs had to stay at home to receive calls either on their home telephones
or via their laptop computers.3 The plaintiffs received around three to
five calls a night, not including calls for other issues.2°' On average, a
response took forty-five minutes.' °
The plaintiffs claimed they were instructed by their supervisor only
to report on-call time during which they responded to an alarm. 23 The
plaintiffs were paid one hour for each call answered, and two hours if the
plaintiffs had to go to an OG&E facility to correct the problem. 24 The
plaintiffs did not report all of the calls answered, nor did they report as
overtime the remainder of the time on call.
190. Id. at 1538.
191. See id.
192. 228 F.3d 1128 (10th Cir. 2000).












205. See Pabst, 228 F.3d at 1131.
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The plaintiffs argued that the on-call procedure significantly inter-
fered with their personal lives.2' The plaintiffs claimed that the calls at
night substantially interrupted their sleep.07 In addition, the plaintiffs
were seldom able to leave their homes while on call because of the fear
that they might miss an alarm.' °
The district court found that all the on-call time was compensable
under the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"). 209 Accordingly, the court
awarded the plaintiffs compensation for fifteen hours per weekday and
twenty-four hours each Saturday and Sunday, minus any hours already
paid by the company.2 1 0
b. Decision
OG&E appealed the judgment against them for prejudgment inter-
est, damages and liability. 2 ' The plaintiffs appealed the ruling of the dis-
trict court denying the plaintiffs' claim of liquidated damages based on
the district court's finding of no willful violation.2 2 The Tenth Circuit
reviewed the FLSA requirement that an employer pay "a minimum wage
for each hour it 'employs' an employee, as well as an overtime premium
for hours in excess of forty per week.,,2 3 The court then framed the issue
as whether "on-call time is 'work' for purposes of the statute.",214 To de-
termine whether on-call time can be classified as work, the court used the
Armour/Skidmore inquiry of whether the "on-call time is spent predomi-
nantly for the benefit of the employer or the employee.",2 5 The court said
that this issue could also be put in terms of whether the "employee is
'engaged to wait' or 'waiting to be engaged.' -21 6 The court's analysis into
whether the plaintiff's on-call time was compensable included such crite-
ria as: "number of calls, required response time, and ability to engage in
personal pursuits while on call. 217 This assessment is "highly individu-
alized and fact-based."28
Here, the court held that the plaintiffs' on-call time was compensa-
ble, comparing the plaintiffs situation with that of Renfro v. City of Em-













See id. at 1131-32.
See Pabst, 228 F.3d at 1132.
See id.
Id. (citing the definition of "employ" in 29 U.S.C. § 2 03(g) (2001) as "to suffer or permit
to work").
214. Id.
215. ld (citing Armour, 323 U.S. at 1
216. Id. at 1132 (quoting Skidmore, 3
217. Pabst, 228 F.3d at 1132.
218. Id.
219. 948 F.2d. 410 (1Oth Cir. 1991).
33).
23 U.S. at 137).
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employees for their on-call time.20 Relevant to their determination was
the fact that even though the plaintiffs were not required to return to an
OG&E building for every call, the frequency of calls made the plaintiffs'
situation particularly burdensome.22'
The court rejected OG&E's argument that the plaintiffs' time spent
doing personal activities should be subtracted from the on-call time com-
pensated.222 This decision was based upon the test of whether the time
spent on call was predominantly spent "for the employer's benefit or for
the employee' S.,,223
C. Other Circuits
The analysis is the same in all circuits surveyed. 224 There is not
much departure from the United States Supreme Court decisions Armour
and Skidmore.25 The primary analysis centers on whether the employee's
time was spent predominantly for the employer or employee.26 Even
though the courts use the same analysis, the outcome can be vastly dif-
ferent. Some courts rule that on-call time should not be compensated
despite long periods of time where the employee is on call, or short re-
227sponse times.
1. Fifth Circuit
The Fifth Circuit uses the same test as the Tenth Circuit. In Bright v.
Houston Northwest Medical Center Survivor, Inc.,228 the Fifth Circuit
held that an employee's on-call time was not compensable when he was
required to respond within twenty minutes of a call.229 The court found
that the employee's on-call time could be spent going shopping, going to
restaurants, and watching television."3 This ruling was despite the fact
220. See Renfro, 228 F.3d at 1134.
221. See id at 1135.
222. See id.
223. Id.
224. See Bright v. Houston N.W. Med. Ctr. Survivor, Inc., 934 F.2d 671 (5th Cir. 1991)
(holding that an employee's on-call time was not compensable when he was required to respond
within twenty minutes of a call); Dingtes v. Sacred Heart St. Mary's Hosp., Inc., 164 F.3d 1056 (7th
Cir. 1999) (focusing on the argument that the time spent on call could be devoted to ordinary private
activities); Cross v. Arkansas Forestry Comm'n, 938 F.2d 912 (8th Cir. 1991) (holding that the
Commission's on-call policy imposed significant restrictions upon the employees' ability to pursue
personal activities).
225. See Armour & Co. v. Wantock, 323 U.S. 126 (1994); Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S.
134(1944).
226. See Armour, 323 U.S. at 133.
227. See Bright v. Houston Northwest Med. Ctr. Survivor, Inc., 934 F.2d 671 (5th Cir. 1991)
(employee on-call for one year with no break); Dinges v. Sacred Heart St. Mary's Hosp., Inc. 164
F.3d 1056 (7th Cir. 1999) (employees were required to respond to call within seven minutes).
228. Bright, 934 F.2d at 672.
229. Id. at 672.
230. See id. at 673.
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that Bright was on-call for an entire year with no reprieve.2 1' "We do not
deny the obvious truth that the long continued aspect of Bright's on-call
status made his job highly undesirable and arguably somewhat oppres-
sive.... But the FLSA's overtime provisions are more narrowly focused
than being simply directed at requiring extra compensation for oppres-
sive or confining conditions for employment., 232 The Fifth Circuit wrote
that the "critical issue" in on-call compensation cases is "whether the
employee can use the [on-call] time effectively for his or her own pur-
poses. 233 Here, Bright was not restricted to the workplace or his home,
but was able to travel anywhere within twenty minutes of the hospital
because the hospital contacted him through use of a beeper.23
2. Seventh Circuit
Similarly, in Dinges v. Sacred Heart St. Mary's Hosp., Inc., the Sev-
enth Circuit recently held that on-call time for Emergency Medical
Technicians is not compensable. 235 The court's analysis focused on the
defendant hospital's argument that the time spent on call could be "de-
voted to ordinary private activities. 236 The court held that because the
employees' actual chance of being called to work while on call was less
than fifty percent, the required seven-minute response time was not con-
clusive that the employees were restricted in their personal activity. In
addition, the court held that in close cases, the court would look to the
agreement of the parties because the FLSA "encouraged parties to struc-
ture a mutually beneficial arrangement., 23 8 By giving deference to the




The Eighth Circuit analysis is also similar to the Tenth Circuit. The
Eighth Circuit determines whether the employee's time is primarily used
for personal activities to decide whether on-call time is compensable.
240
In Cross v. Arkansas Forestry Comm'n,24 the plaintiffs were employed
by the Arkansas Forestry Commission ("Commission"), and were on-call
twenty-four hours per day, seven days per week.24 2 The Commission did
231. See id. at 678.
232. Id.
233. Id. at 677.
234. See Bright, 934 F.2d at 678.
235. See Dinges v. Sacred Heart St. Mary's Hosp., Inc., 164 F.3d 1056 (7th Cir. 1999).




239. See id. at 172-173.
240. See Cross v. Arkansas Forestry Comm'n, 938 F.2d 912, 916-17 (8th Cir. 1991).
241. 938 F.2d 912 (8th Cir. 1991).
242. See Cross. 938 F.2d at 914.
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not compensate the employees for any time on-call, arguing that the
FLSA exempted employees engaged in "fire protection activities," and as
such the overtime hours were calculated over a twenty-eight day time
period rather than a standard week.2 43 The employees argued that the on-
call policy restricted the employees from using their time for personal
activities.2 4 The Eight Circuit agreed, holding that the Commission's on-
call policy imposed significant restrictions upon the employees' ability to
pursue personal activities. 24s The court cited that the employees' ability to
travel was limited, and they must monitor their radios for transmissions,
which restricted the employees to an area of thirty-five to fifty miles.24
Further, the employees' ability to attend musical or sporting events,
church, or other events that cost much money was hindered due to the
constant requirement to monitor their radios and the possibility of having
to leave the event to respond to a call.247 Thus the court held that the em-
ployees were engaged to wait because the on-call conditions were so
restrictive that the employees could not use their time for personal ac-
tivities.2'48
D. Analysis
Some scholars argue that on-call cases are different from "waiting
time" cases like Armour and Skidmore because even though the em-
ployee may enjoy more time away from work, the burden on the em-
ployee may be greater due to the employer placing the employee on-call
for more time as a result of the increased time away from work.249 For
example, some employers, as in Cross and Bright, place employees on-
call for all time spent away from the workplace.25
The analysis of the courts appears to focus on the hindrance of the
on-call situation on the employee's personal activities.' A key aspect in
determining the burden on the employee is how many calls the on-call
employee receives on average and the length of the call.52 Therefore, the
greater number of calls a person receives, the more likely it is that the
on-call time will be deemed compensable. Another factor in determining
the intrusion into the employee's personal life is the response time re-
243. Id.
244. See id. at 915-16.
245. See id. at 916.
246. See id. at 916-17.
247. See id. at 917.
248. See Cross, 938 F.2d at 917.
249. Phillips, supra note 173, at 2639.
250. See id
251. See Pabst v. Okla. Gas & Elec. Co., 228 F3d 1128, 1131 (10th Cir. 2000).
252. See Phillips, supra note 173, at 2641-43.
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quired by the employer2 3 Some scholars argue that very short response
times should be enough to compel compensation for on-call time.'
The benefit to the employer is often overlooked in a court's analysis
of an on-call time issue, even though courts cite it as part of the
analysis.255 Courts do not consider the cost efficiency of placing employ-
ees on-call for much of the employee's time spent away from work in
order to gain employee time without compensation. One scholar argues
that courts should compare the employer's benefit of on-call work
against regular time at work.256 Here, the employer knows that placing an
employee on-call instead of requiring an employee to remain at work at
all times keeps the requirement of paying employees at a minimum.2' "If
the [on-call] employee did not have to respond, then the employer either
would have to go without the service or would have to pay somebody at




The use of beepers and cell-phones are keeping employers increasingly
in touch with their employees and this time may sometimes require com-
pensation.
What makes Pabst stand out is that it is one of the few Tenth Circuit
cases that awarded compensation to those employees who claimed their
on-call time should be compensable.259 It joins the Renfro line of deci-
sions departing from the typical Tenth Circuit practice of denying such
claims.26
CONCLUSION
In 2001, the Tenth Circuit decided these important cases in three
areas of employment law. The Tenth Circuit refined the meaning of "rea-
sonable accommodation" in two ADA cases, decided whether to protect
free speech in the workplace, and revisited the issue of on-call time un-
der the Fair Labor Standards Act. The three areas of law discussed in this
article show the diversity of issues within the field of employment law.
Surely the courts have not refined these topics to their fullest extent, and
therefore, we can expect more from the Tenth Circuit in the future on
these and other employment law issues.
Gretchen Fuss
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